Ambiguity of 4-3-3
Briefly explained in this earlier article, the definition of 4-3-3 is somewhat ambiguous.
Traditionally, it's understood as an evolutionary product of 4-2-4, which roots all the way to WM. Problem is, this strategy is very flexible from the waist up, and for each of its offensive variations there's a different matching defensive concept.
In Rinus Michels' 4-3-3. The center of upper midfield is left opened. Once possession is obtained, the ball is moved up quickly through the wings, and only the DM at rear pivot is controlling the mid route spaces.
If the 2 outside midfielders move towards the middle, the formation is modified into 4-1-2-2-1 (4-5-1) and the wing spaces are left relatively unprotected. The defense is therefore required to press higher than in normal 4-3-3, basically a concept to restrict the space on the wings by reducing vertical distances between the D-line and midfield.
If more defensive measures are taken by having the wingers dropping back to tighten up the wing spaces even further, then the formation evolves into 4-1-4-1, like what Jose Mourinho's Chelsea played, this could still be considered 4-3-3 variant. In this form, the defense, in particular fullbacks, need to be more aggressive to initiate offensives and counter attacks from the rear so there will be enough attacking elements overall.
Last but not least, there's the offensive adjustment to 4-3-3 by dropping the DM to center defender and push both fullbacks to wing midfield positions. This modification results in 3-4-3, which is an ambiguity headache all by itself...
In other words, what Frank Rijkaard prepared for the upcoming season is quite different from what he had played in the past couple of years. It's Rinus Michels' 4-3-3. The defensive concept employed in such strategy is proved to be more reliable than that of 4-1-2-2-1.
No comments:
Post a Comment