Requiem for a Dream

Argentina went into 2002 World Cup with a FIFA world rank of 3 (behind defending champion France and '98 runner up Brazil), and was hailed tournament favorite by media. With a lineup including Batistuta, Crespo, Aimar, Ortega, Veron, Ayala, Zanetti, Samuel, Simeone, Sorin and Caniggia, "stacked" was an understatement, and quite possibly no one had questioned the trouble-free qualifying journey.

Why should they? In the 18 qualifiers, Argentina won 13, drew 4 and obtained an average of 2.4 points per match. Besides the goal leader Hernan Crespo with 9, we also had Claudio Lopez, Batistuta and Veron in the top 10 scorer list of CONMEBOL qualifying stage. Marcelo Bielsa's European style 4-4-1-1 emphasizing on lobs and crosses practically steamrolled our South America opponents. Every Argentine had a smile on the face...

They wouldn't have been so confident if they had known the inflexibility and arrogance of Marcelo Bielsa.

In Japan, Bielsa started out with Batistuta as target person supported by Claudio Lopez (later replaced by Kily Gonzalez) and Ortega from the flanks, while veron playing pivot so the formation looked like a 3-3-1-3 on the pitch.

There were some personnel problems with Bielsa's schematic. To name a few:
1.Veron had been out of favor in ManU for 1/2 a year and had just came out of an achilles tendon injury.
2.Exclusion of Riquelme and Saviola from the team
3.Bielsa's reluctance to play Crespo and Batistuta together.
4.Simeone was not completely fit and occupied too important a position.
5.35 year old Claudio Cannigia did nothing more than getting a red card while sitting on the bench.
6.Ortega likes cutting through the center so he was playing out of position.
7.Kily Gonzalez was similar to Ortega and was forced to play too wide on the wing.
8.Veron wasn't able to cope with Sorin and Zanetti's pace and wasn't effectively supported by those 2.

However, all of these problems were side dishes compared to Bielsa's stubbornness in the general approach. Regardless who we played and where we played, he always wanted to take the initiative, always forcing the issue and always pressing. Opportunistic approach was not an option, the risks involved in pure attacking football with the same strategy over and over was happily accepted.

Was there no warning? There were. During the qualifiers, a 3-1 away defeat against Brazil was the first sign. Then we managed to win at home but Ayala also put in an international own goal. We also saw problem against Uruguay but Claudio Lopez's equalizer just before half time calmed us down again... The best warning was perhaps Bielsa's unsuccessful stint at Espanyol, but that was 3 years ago and largely forgotten after the qualifier triumphs.

In Japan, our first group match was against the 2nd place African qualifier Nigeria (sounds dangerous doesn't it?). With Kanu injured and substituted out soon after the half time break, Nigeria turned out to be nothing more than another team that was incapable of handling the European style long lob attacks (they eventually left Japan with just 1 point). Argentina dominated possession, and with 11 to 4 corner ratio and 19 to 9 shot ratio, Nigeria was lucky to walk out with just -1 goal differential. Even though the defense lacked confidence without Ayala, the win was convincing, and fans started thinking about knockout stages after the victory.

Then the lost against England.
England wasn't embarrassed to stick one man in the front and sit the rest behind the ball. As their manager Sven-Göran Eriksson put it, they were happy to "play on the break and hope to get one off a set piece". Why not? They were against a South American team trying to play their own style of attacking football. These guys knew exactly what to look for and all they needed was playing good defense till opportunity arises.
In this kind of crossing football, midfield dominance and extreme percentage of possession means nothing if the finisher(s) cannot convert in the box. Bielsa's decision to stick with 1 target person on the field reduced our chance to make that connection by 50%. In a match where Argentina had absolute dominance in possession, we only managed 12 shots and 5 on target. England sat 10 men in their box almost the entire match and ended up with 15 shots and 8 on target! Football is about creating opportunities. It doesn't matter how they were created, whether from composed assaults or counter attacks, whoever gets more total chances will likely become the victor.
Owens' counter attack earned (there's no point arguing over this anymore, the outcome is what mattered) England a PK just before half time, and Dave Beckham converted it. In second half, Bielsa subbed in Aimar for Veron (who was playing at his natural position but chose to cross the ball in more from the flanks), later Crespo for Batistuta and Claudio for Gonzalez. These substitutions increased movements on the field, but failed to break down the defensive umbrella England had put up around and over their box. The basic approach of Argentine attack was unchanged, and it remained ineffective against England for the rest of the match.

Whoever made this picture had obviously very limited understanding of the game

The lost hit hard. Argentina went from tournament favorite to a position where we didn't even know if second round appearance would be possible. Since England-Nigeria game would go on the same time as the confrontation between Sweden and Argentina, the final group match was a MUST WIN for us (Sweden and England had 4 points each, Argentina 3 and Nigeria 0).

Sweden had been undefeated for eleven matches before meeting Argentina, and they had come back from behind to tie England 1-1 in their opening match. Marcelo Bielsa chose to retained the same strategy with some personnel adjustments, namely Almeyda for Simeone, Aimar for Veron, and Chamot for Diego Placente in defense.
Again, Argentina totally dominated the midfield, but was unable to make that crucial connection between our midfielders and the striker. The first half went by without even one successful delivery to Batistuta, and our best chances came when Sorin, flanking on the left, saw crosses from the wings. Some long shots also missed the target, and we kept pressing looking for the go ahead goal.
The second half saw more fruitless pressing from Argentina and more narrow escapes from Swedish counter attacks. At this point, England was of course still tied 0-0 with Nigeria, as that turned out to be the final score. Towards 60th minute, Gabriel failed to reach what could of been a critical header, and Bielsa's nerves finally cracked. He took out Batistuta and put on Hernan Crespo. Bielsa had been criticized for 5 years for this substitution, many believed he should of used the two target players simultaneously. My question is, would that had changed our fate? IMHO, the fundamental problem in Bielsa's campaign was the willingness to take all the risks by employing attacking philosophy at all times.
Anyroad, at 59th minute (seconds after the substitution), Sweden made an explosive counter attack run with their midfielder Svensson who was wide open just pass the half way mark. Matias Almeyda was forced to foul him to prevent a breakaway, and Sweden was awarded a freekick from the perfect position (2 feet in front of the arc, off center, 3 feet to the left). Svensson took that freekick beautifully, bending over the wall into the top left corner. Cavallero had no chance.
If Bielsa had already cracked when he took out Batistuta, he completely lost it after this goal. It was 60 minute into the game, and we must win to move on. He took out 2 defensive players (sorin and Almeyda), and put on 2 more crossers (Gonzalez and Veron) to make a last ditch struggle with his strategy.
Bielsa's desperation did not pay off. Instead, we almost conceded another goal on couple occasions. A questionable call gave us a PK at 88th minute. Even though Crespo was able to rebound the ball in after the Swedish goalie had blocked Ortega's initial kick, and saved Argentina from another embarrassing 0-1 defeat. It was too little, and too late.

When we had absolute superiority over our opponents, Bielsa was able to not only win, but also win with electrifying performances and class. However, when against competent oppositions who were willing to sit back and patiently absorb our assaults, Bielsa failed to produce result even when we desperately needed the points. On top of that, he was severally punished by counter attacks.

That same statement could also be applied to many Argentine coaches and several generations of our National team, because it is a lesson that, to this day, we still have not learned.

Alfio Basile is the same type of DT as Marcelo Bielsa.
Unlike Bielsa, Basile would make tactical changes to utilize both air and ground routes. However, from a more fundamental point of view, these 2 take on their campaigns with the exact same approach. An approach that could produce fantastic results against overmatched opponents, but lacks the necessary flexibility and adaptability to win competitive tournaments.

What had recently happened, and what's happening before our eyes, are all parts of the requiem for a bad dream.